Despite the fact that 2019 was less tumultuous in terms of security in Black Sea compared with 2018 this region continues to be one of the fulcrums of continuous confrontation between US and its partners on the one hand and Russia on the other hand.
Russia continues to see occupied Crimea as one of the major elements of its military posture as transfer of new combat platforms and major drills attest. At the same time, other littoral states are not able to pursue a unified approach towards Russian increasingly militaristic posture in Black Sea. Ukraine and Romania are more forceful in the need to actively confront Russia. Bulgaria is more circumspect in this regard and would like to continue balancing policy between Russia and NATO/EU. Turkey doesn’t see Black Sea security as an issue on its right, marred in tensions with Greece, Cyprus, in Syria and recently Libya.
That’s why it’s not a surprise that NATO is much more restrained in Black Sea security issues compared with northern part of eastern flank where Poland and Baltic countries act more or less jointly on issues of security. US sees Black Sea basin as one of frontiers of containment policy towards Russia. Washington is ready to dedicate necessary resources to confront Russia in this part of world as 2019 made clear. But in this case US global commitments could strain American desire to check Russia in Black Sea.
Russia
2019 was marked by a new tendency in Russian Black Sea fleet – slowdown in rearmament. In 2015-17 Russian Black Sea fleet got 3 frigates of 11356 class, 2 corvettes of 21631 class (though in 2016 they were transferred to Baltic Sea) and 6 submarines of 636.3 class. But in last two years Russian Black Sea fleet got only 3 corvettes of 21631 class, 2 patrol vessels of 22160 class and 1 minesweeper of 12700 class. As it’s envisioned in the future Russian Black Sea fleet will increase its firepower first of all through inclusion of corvettes of 22800 class. First two hulls of this ship-class were launched in October 2019 in Feodosia – though their full outfit will be done in Saint-Petersburg. New classes of major combatants only partially remedied situation with Black Sea fleet aging. Approximately 80% of major platforms are those launched at least in the end of 1980-s or the beginning of 1990-s. Under Russia MOD calculation navy forces of Southern Military District (SMD) are modern only on 43%. Though SMD also controls Caspian Flotilla aging Black Sea fleet platforms also contribute to this not so rosy statistics.
Despite problems with Black Sea fleet rearmament Russian forces in occupied Crimea were very active in military training all along 2019. Anti-air defense was the most commonly practiced exercise. Russian forces trained to defeat mass cruise missile attack and aviation assaults. It’s no coincidence that 31st Air Defense Division in Crimea (2 regiments with 4 divisions in total) completed rearmament with new S-400 systems back in December 2018. Russia sees a major threat from possible mass employment of US/NATO airpower in case of open confrontation.
2019 was also noteworthy of combined exercises done by Black Sea fleet and 4th Air Forces and Air Defense Army responsible for whole SMD. Those exercises were done in April, May, July and August. But the most noteworthy ones were those in April and July 2019. More than 100 planes and helicopters were involved in April 2019 drills. 20 planes of different types (Su-27SM, Su-34, Su-24M, Su-25SM) practiced breaching air-defense of destroyer and frigate class of ships for rockets and bombs attack. Su-27SM, Su-27P, Su-30SM trained to shoot 20 mock air-targets with AAMs. Hight activity of planes were used by S-400 to practice target designation, acquisition and mock attacks. A-50 AWACS aircraft was used for provision of targeting information. Even pair of Tu-160 made an overflight over Black Sea. «Rostov-on-Done» submarine practiced use of high-precision missiles for land attacks. Be-12 aircraft and Ka-27PL helicopters used «Rostov-on-Done» exercise to train anti-submarine warfare skills. So it’s possible to say that April 2019 was a rehearsal for a major conflagration with NATO in Black Sea basin.
In July, against the backdrop of Ukrainian-American Sea Breeze 2019 exercises, the Black Sea fleet and 4th Air Forces and Air Defense Army again worked out joint actions to combat the enemy’s surface and air forces. Air defense systems S-400 and Patnsir S1 worked to detect and destroy the cruise missiles and the UAV of the enemy – at least 100 targets. Orekhovo-Zuevo and Mirage missile corvettes accomplished the task of striking surface and ground targets. Up to 20 Su-27 and Su-30M2 fighters based in the Crimea were involved in drills – first by withdrawing forces from attack and then gaining dominance in the air though their employment.
Russia also paid much attention to training of ground-based anti-ship missile complexes. During January-first half of November 2019, at least 10 cases of training of Bal and Bastion anti-ship missile complexes took place in Crimea. Those were either just anti-ship missile complexes drill or as part of large-scale exercises like the one last May. Operators of anti-ship missile complexes have worked out the issues of preparing positions for missile launch, as well as the rapid change of positions after mock missile launch. In the same period, at least 8 episodes of training on the detection and destruction of enemy submarines were conducted – in 3 out of 8 cases the real submarines of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (Rostov-on-Don, Stary Oskol) were involved as targets to make exercises more realistic.
Between January and the first half of November 2019, 10 trainings were conducted involving submarines of 636.3 class, frigates of 11356 class and corvettes of 21631 on the use Caliber cruise missile to strike land and sea surface targets. These training events took place both as part of the training of individual ships or as in the process of working out the creation and use of an interservice force grouping in case of a high-intensity war with NATO. However, there were only two real missile launches in August and October 2019. Today, the Black Sea fleet has 10 combatants armed with of Caliber cruise missiles, which can do a simultaneous volley of 72 missiles.
The forces posted by Russia in occupied Crimea aim to effectively counter US/NATO attempts to use surface naval forces, cruise missiles and tactical aviation for power projection in case of need. In the initial stages of the hypothetical conflict in the Black Sea, Russian surface forces under the protection of anti-ship missiles and medium-range air defense systems will dominate in this part of the oceans – until US creates their own interservice grouping in the region, which would require at least 2-3 weeks.
Strategic defensive posture does not mean the refusal of the Russian Federation to take active offensive actions at the operational and tactical levels. Moreover, active strategic defense requires a proactive approach at the lower levels. In this case, a complex system of A2/AD capabilities actually creates a favorable environment for the active action of the BSF at the operational and tactical levels.
At the same time, the potential of the Russian Federation to project force in the Black Sea basin on its own is inferior to the potential to prevent the projection of force by US/NATO forces. Russian potential of sea-denial should not be conflated with potential to such sea-control exercises as blockade. Though enhanced during last 6 years grouping of forces in occupied Crimea makes Russia more self-confident in Black Sea – especially with regards to such countries like Ukraine which doesn’t have NATO article 5 protection clause.
Romania
Of all NATO Black Sea countries, Romania is at most risk due to the activities of the Russian Federation in Crimea – due to its geographical proximity to occupied peninsular and economic activities at sea. Last year, almost 66.6 million tons of goods went through Romania’s seaports.
Intensification of the Russian military threat forced Romania to seriously return to its fleet modernization program, which was planned to begin in the second half of the 2000s, but had to be delayed due to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-09, which in turn led to defense budget reductions. As for today Romanian navy has 18 major surface warships and boats built in the 1980s-1990s. As a result, these ships and boats do not meet the modern sea warfare requirements like robust air-defense.
In 2017, Bucharest launched a program to modernize the country’s armed forces worth 8.9 billion euros, of which 1.6 billion euros are planned to be spent on the naval component. Romania’s plans to modernize its navy include the purchase of 4 new multifunctional corvettes, the modernization of 2 Type 22 frigates, the purchase of new ground-based anti-ship missile systems to replace the Soviet “Rubezh” systems.
The purchase of four multifunctional corvettes is currently a major component of current navy modernization program. The new ships are to replace 4 anti-submarine corvettes that were launched during 1983-91. These ships do not have anti-ship missiles and a serious air defense system, and therefore are outdated.
Bureaucratic obstacles have led to a significant slowdown in the implementation of the project to build 4 new corvettes. Although formally, the process of selecting a new type of corvette was started back in 2016. Respective tender was suspended and relaunched two times in 2018 and 2019. Second time it was specified that prospective corvette’s displacement could be up to 3500 tons and it should be able to accomplish at least 2 of 3 major tasks in sea warfare (ASuW and AAW or ASW). In July 2019, Romania finally decided to choose Gowind 2500 corvette from the French company Naval Group. All 4 corvettes are expected to be built in 7 years and the first to be transferred to the Romanian navy in 2022. As part of the plan to create new corvettes, the Romanian government plans to promote the development of local industry. As a consequence, according to the tender conditions for 4 corvettes, the winner must have local production facilities to build the hulls of ships. This requirement is logical from the point of view of previous Romanian experience – out of 18 current ships and boats 16 were built in Romania.
Plans to upgrade two Type 22 frigates bought in UK in mid 2000s is indeed in question. The budget of this project is only 220 million euro, although the nomenclature of work on these two frigates involves the installation of new radars, new combat management systems, air defense interceptors and anti-ship missiles. Therefore, it is quite possible that in the 2020s, instead of upgrading the respective frigates, it will be decided to write them off. The chances of this would increase greatly if the program to create 4 new corvettes achieves significant results to that time.
By 2023, Romania plans to choose a supplier of new ground-based anti-ship missile complexes – purchase of 3 batteries of anti-ship missile complexes is expected to cost 200 million euros. The tender to procure new ground-based anti-ship missile complexes was launched in October 2018. Also, in 2018 Bucharest discussed the possibility of purchasing 3 diesel-electric submarines. The idea of getting 3 submarines is interesting because of the asymmetric action potential of this type of weapon. However, the final decision on this issue will not be done before the end of 2020. The cost of 1 modern conventional submarine (up to 500 million euros) may force Romania to abandon this idea.
Bucharest separately purchases medium-range Patriot air defense systems and F-16A/B Block 15 fighter jets. These systems can also be used to influence the situation at sea. By mid-2020s, Bucharest may create its own analogue of A2/AD zone as opposed to the Russian one already established in Crimea. As a result, the United States is ready to rely on Romania as part of a policy to counteract Russia’s growing influence in the Black Sea. This decision is logical both because of the existence of a relevant political position in Bucharest and thanks to an active program of modernization of the Romanian armed forces.
However, it should be noted that the modernization of other army branches competes with the needs of the navy modernization. For instance, the purchase of the first batch of used fighter jets in Portugal forced Bucharest to postpone the start of the tender for the purchase of corvettes from 2012 to 2016. Thus, the relatively weak economic base will be another obstacle to the rapid modernization of Romania’s navy, as well as to all the forces that can affect the situation at sea.
Bulgaria
Unlike its northern neighbor, Bulgaria is more reserved about Black Sea security issues. Despite its membership of NATO and the EU, Bulgaria’s foreign policy continues the tradition of balancing between West and Russia. So, in 2016, on the eve of the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov came up with the idea of turning the Black Sea into a demilitarized zone. Similarly, Bulgaria is partly responsible for the failure of the creation of a separate NATO flotilla in the Black Sea in 2016. The Bulgarians could not agree with the fact that Turkey would command the respective forces on a rotational basis. In addition, the creation of a suitable flotilla could have been seen as too anti-Russian step, which could only lead to an undesirable exacerbation of tensions in the Black Sea basin, which in turn could have had a negative impact on Bulgaria’s tourism sector. Statement made by Prime Minister Boyko Borisov during visit to Washington in November 2019 on readiness to host NATO maritime security coordination center in Varna should also be perceived through the lenses of balancing policy. This statement could please Washington which expects more forceful approach to Russia. But coordination center is not the same as commitment of specific platforms for the combined permanent NATO Black Sea basin flotilla.
However, despite such political calculations, Bulgaria plans to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2024. Similarly, the current head of the country Rumen Radev, despite the desire to maintain good relations with the Russian Federation, advocates the modernization of the country’s armed forces. Today, the country has a government program of modernization of the armed forces, which was adopted back in 2015. This document is significant in that it indicates the absence of a significant conventional threat to NATO and Bulgaria in the Black Sea.
Respective program of modernization of the armed forces envisages strengthening of the Bulgarian navy. The current basis of the combat potential of navy is 3 frigates purchased in Belgium during the 2000s, as well as 1 missile corvette project 1241, 1 anti-submarine frigate and 2 anti-submarine corvettes of Soviet construction. Interestingly, unlike Romanian frigates purchased in the UK, Bulgarian frigates purchased in Belgium were handed over to Sofia with available anti-aircraft and anti-ship weapons.
Since 2004, the possibility of purchasing new corvettes has been actively discussed in Bulgaria. At that time, option to purchase at least 4 corvettes was discussed. However, at the moment, according to the program of modernization of the Bulgarian national fleet, purchase of only 2 corvettes/multipurpose patrol ships is discussed. The cost of creating two ships varies from $ 471 million to $ 567 million. The project was planned to be implemented by 2022-24. The first tender for the purchase of two ships was announced in 2017 and then canceled. The second tender was announced in 2019. In March 2020 it was reported that Sofia decided to opt for 2 Lurssen built corvettes/multipurpose patrol ships. However, there may be problems with the financing of this project. Earlier, Bulgaria had said that payments for two ships would be extended over a period of 10 years. Today, an additional problem may be the purchase of 16 F-16 Block 70/72 fighter jets to replace the Soviet MiG-29 fighter jets. In fact, the government may not be left free to finance build-up of 2 corvettes/multi-purpose patrol ships.
It is also interesting that the government program of development of the Bulgarian Armed Forces from 2015 envisaged in addition to the acquisition of new surface warships the acquisition of ground-based anti-ship missile systems to replace the Soviet systems. However, there is no specification of this goal in the country’s military procurement plans. This is due to significant financial constraints in the country.
Thus, at political and military level, Bulgaria, unlike Romania, cannot be considered as an independent influential player in Black Sea military security issues.
Turkey
Of all NATO’s Black Sea countries, Turkey has the greatest military potential to influence the maritime situation in this part of the world ocean. On paper Ankara has 16 frigates, 10 corvettes and 12 submarines. However, such a formal numerical advantage, including over Russian Black Sea fleet, does not mean that Ankara is ready and can be an active player in curbing Russian ambitions in the region. On the contrary, there is an opposite tendency. First of all, at the level of Turkey’s grand strategy towards the Black Sea basin.
In fact, Ankara is currently pursuing a policy that was initiated in the 1990s in attempt to build a security architecture in the Black Sea basin along with Moscow, including by minimizing interventions by non-regional states, primarily the United States. Turkey actively demonstrated this approach in 2008. At the time of the Russian war against Georgia, Ankara was not a neutral bystander, but was playing to the Russian side when it came against the possible expansion of the US naval presence in the Black Sea with a possible formal violation of the Montreux Convention. Turkey opposed such a move.
Respective Turkish approach continues to be implemented by Ankara after the Russian aggression against Ukraine began. Turkey did not recognize the annexation of Crimea, however, and it did not join the sanctions against the Russian Federation imposed by the US and the EU. In the Navy’s Development Strategy (October 2015), Ankara stated that its goal was to create a Black Sea security community that would eliminate the need for outside players to interfere in the region’s affairs. The document also said that the US, NATO and the EU had virtually left the Russian Federation no choice but to react aggressively in the case Western attempts to expand their sphere of influence by means of Georgia and Ukraine. As a consequence, Ankara, unlike Bucharest, is not an active supporter of NATO’s increased presence in the region. Therefore, Turkey did not put this issue on the agenda at the NATO Brussels Summit in July 2018. Recep Erdogan’s statements in the spring of 2016 criticizing the Alliance for inaction on the Black Sea security, which as a consequence becomes a Russian lake, can be viewed in the context of the then-Turkish-Russian crisis in relations against the backdrop of the November 2015 downing of the Russian Su-24M by Turkish F-16. After Ankara and Moscow succeeded in normalizing relations in the summer of 2016, the Turkish side has shown no active stance on the need to increase US and NATO presence in the Black Sea basin. In the conditions when the Russian Federation receives new levers of influence on Turkey, including through the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, it can be expected that in the case of the Black Sea security, Ankara will continue to defend a position closer to the interests of the Russian Federation than the interests of countries such as Romania or Ukraine. Therefore, it is not surprising that at once a number of American researchers are skeptical about the possibility of betting on Turkey in the strategy of counteracting the spread of Russian influence in the Black Sea basin. Moreover, there is an open distrust on the part of Washington about Turkey’s ability to go within the limits of NATO’s unified Black Sea policy.
Turkey’s perception of security issues in the Black Sea is affected by two other important points. First of all, this issue is not self-sufficient for Ankara – including because Turkey’s economic activity center is in the Aegean and Mediterranean sea. As practice shows, Turkey’s position on the Black Sea security is a consequence of the dynamics of relations with the US and the Russian Federation on a number of other issues – including the Syrian conflict or confrontation over the supply of S-400 air defense systems. Similarly, the vision of the national fleet’s functions directs Ankara to actively use the Navy in matters relating to the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. In the first case we are talking about territorial disputes with Greece, in the other, about supporting the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as well as the issue of extraction of energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean. Such dynamics displaces issues related to the Black Sea security from Turkey’s foreign policy agenda and makes the issue not self-sufficient but secondary, the policy of which is determined by the situation in more important areas.
All these calculations make it impossible for Turkey to play an active role as a deterrent to Russian military expansion in the Black Sea. This is reinforced by the fact that formally, the Turkish Navy, which dominates the Black Sea Fleet in terms of the number of hulls of the respective classes, can no longer compete equally with the Crimean grouping of Russian troops. Only 12 of the 16 frigates could be considered more or less eligible for this task. The 8 frigates are the former Oliver Hazard Perry American frigates, which were obtained in the 1990s and early 2000s and then upgraded to enhance the air defense capabilities. Another 4 Barbaros class frigates, which were created in the second half of the 1990s, are also being upgraded to enhance the capacity of air defense. Upgrade envisions installing new radars and new ESSM interceptors. Of the 10 Corvettes, only 4 are modern Ada-class corvettes. A common weakness of the Turkish fleet is also that the ships lack long-range land attack missile potential. This potential is important in the context that much of Russian capabilities to influence the situation in the Black Sea is related to land-based platforms in the occupied Crimea.
At present, Turkey plans to develop its own military-industrial complex (MIC) at the expense of naval construction. This involves not just the Ada Project corvettes, which are the first indigenous ones, including the Turkish Atmaca anti-ship missile. It also relates to Istanbul class frigates and TF-2000 project air defense frigates/destroyers. Ankara’s desire to develop its own MIC at the expense of meeting the needs of the national navy significantly slows down the process of obtaining modern ships that would be able to play an active role in Black Sea security if Turkey so desires.
As it was shown, there are a number of factors affecting Turkey’s Black Sea policy. This is a desire not to get involved in an open confrontation with the Russian Federation on the US/NATO side, combined with the desire to resolve Black Sea security issues together with Moscow. This is due to the lack of sufficient economic incentives and the presence of other problems in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, which require the resources of the Turkish Navy. Attempting to develop its own MIC by meeting the needs of the Navy slows down the process of obtaining new ships. At the same time, the Turkish fleet in its present form, although quantitatively still superior over Russian Black Sea fleet, but qualitatively lags behind the requirements imposed by the new Russian weapons systems in the Crimea. A particular downside is the lack of land-attack long-range cruise missiles. This set of political and military factors has determined that the United States does not currently consider Turkey as a state that could be relied on to implement a unified Western strategy to counteract Russia’s growing influence in the Black Sea basin.
US
The United States identifies the Black Sea as one of the eighteen key regions of the oceans, requiring attention and appropriate resources because of its importance. Thus through the pretense of destroyer USS Donald Cook in Black Sea back in early March 2014, the US was were able to demonstrate their concern about the process of occupation of the Crimea.
US military capability will be decisive in the event of a war in the Black Sea area involving the Russian Federation and NATO countries. It concerns the surface ships and submarines of the US Navy, which are carriers of the Tomahawk cruise missile. Missiles of this type in the case of their massive use can effectively counteract created in the occupied Crimea an interservice grouping of Russian troops. So it is not surprising that the presence in the Black or adjacent seas of American destroyers with guided missile weapons is the cause of big irritation in Moskov. And that is why the Russian forces in the occupied Crimea are concerned mostly with the issues related to air defense. Another important factor will be the ability of the United States to build up tactical fighter aircraft grouping. To this end, 4 airfields have been modernized in Romania, Hungary and Slovakia as part of the European Deterrence Initiative. The United States also plans to bring in strategic B-52 bombers, which are carriers of air-to-land cruise missiles, as needed. This is evidenced by flights of this type of aircraft in October 2019 over the Black Sea. The involvement of up to 4 F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter squadrons based on aircraft carriers is not excluded in Washington. In 2018-19, USS carriers Harry S. Truman and USS Abraham Lincoln explored the possibility of using deck aviation in the event of a conflict in CEE – including a possible conflict in the Black Sea basin. From this it can be concluded that the restriction of the Montreux Convention on the tonnage and length of stay of warships of non-littoral states in the Black Sea is not of fundamental importance for the USA if it is necessary to react to the aggravation of the situation in case of war. Washington will rely on missiles with stand-off potential, as well as tactical aircraft, rather than on presence of its surface ships in the Black Sea as the prime means of response.
However, despite such preparations, Washington is facing with a mismatch in the capabilities of its armed forces and the need to fulfill all its commitments in Eurasia. This has a negative effect on the ability of the United States to maintain maximum naval presence in the Black Sea region. For example, in March 2019, then-Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command and NATO Forces in Europe, General Curtis Scaparotti, noted that American forces on the continent still need at least 2 more destroyers with guided missiles to respond actively to Russian expansion. The lack of resources at the disposal of the US military in Europe is well demonstrated by the fact that last year all four US missile destroyers, assigned to the port of Rota (Spain), visited the Black Sea. 3 of 4 destroyers visited Black Sea twice last year. In this way, the 6th Fleet Command makes maximum use of available resources to maintain its presence in European waters, including the Black Sea.
In fact, the Central Command and 5th Fleet (Middle East and Persian Gulf) are competing with 6th Fleet for resources of US Navy bases of east coast. In 2018, supercarrier USS Harry S. Truman twice visited the area of responsibility of 6th fleet – at the same time in the Gulf region US did not have a carrier strike group. In 2019 four US Navy ships (1 cruiser, 3 destroyers) were forced to complete missions in European waters quickly in late September and early October and head to the Gulf to support USS Abraham Lincoln. These ships visited Souda Bay (Crete, Greece) during transit, but because they were forced to quickly go to the area of responsibility of the 5th fleet, they were unable to enter the Black Sea to display the flag. This year USS Ross entered Black Sea only at the end of February – the first US combat ship in 2020. At the same time USS Carney which was in Black Sea only once in 2019 this year went to 5th Fleet AOR given rise in tensions with Iran. Now for the first time since 2012 2 US supercarriers (USS Harry S. Truman and USS Dwight Eisenhower) are near Iran – and none is in 6th fleet area.
As a result, a rather ambiguous situation is emerging. On the one hand, US is pinned with the greatest hopes for its ability to counteract Russia in Black Sea. This is due to the significant economic weakness of countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, which makes it impossible for them to finance relevant naval programs in a timely and qualitative manner. Only United States can fairly quickly offset the relative military weakness of the Black Sea states. In addition, only United States has the appropriate missile capability to effectively combat Russian major combat platforms in occupied Crimea if necessary. Washington not only understands the United States’ exceptional role in Black Sea security, but also works on various aspects of the response to the deteriorating situation in Black Sea basin up to the possible need to wage a high-intensity war. Washington, on the other hand, faces a lack of resources in the context of its ability to fulfill its formal or informal obligations towards the countries of Europe, the Middle East and the Indian-Pacific region. As a consequence, it significantly reduces Washington’s ability to play an active role in Black Sea security. The Donald Trump administration’s policy of escalating the confrontation with Iran is effectively diverting resources from containment of Russia. This is best demonstrated by the fierce competition between the 5 and 6 fleets for resources of the US Navy east coast bases. Thus, Washington’s desire and willingness to play an active role in Black Sea security is counterbalanced by the lack of available resources given needs of US global posture.
NATO
In the case of NATO’s Black Sea policy, not only the lack of resources but also the considerable reactivity in response to the Russian military build-up in occupied Crimea is evident. So, until the fall of 2016, the Alliance preferred to largely ignore Black Sea security issues. In essence, all attention was focused on strengthening the defense capabilities of the northern part of the eastern flank of NATO – the Baltic States and Poland. This approach, on the one hand, is justified because the Russian Federation has far more tools to project force on land than at sea. The possible aggression against the Baltic states with their partial or full occupation looks much more realistic than a hypothetical Russian landing near Constance or the mouth of the Danube. However, the neglect of the Black Sea security against the background of much faster militarization of Crimea than the Kaliningrad region was criticized by a number of US researchers back in 2016. At the NATO level, Black Sea security issues began to be discussed only in October 2016, with measures taken which have little to do with maritime security itself. It concerns the decision to establish a multinational brigade in Romania based on Romanian forces. Separately in 2017, the practice of engaging tactical fighter aircraft of NATO non-Black Sea countries to intercept Russian aircraft in Romania’s airspace was initiated. It involves just 4 fighters.
In the case of the naval component, NATO prefers to rely in this case on the Black Sea states or on geographically close states such as Greece or Turkey. When ships of SNMCMG 2 came to Odessa in October 2019, out of 4 ships 2 belonged to Romania and Bulgaria navies. In part, this approach to rely on coastal countries’ navies to counteract the Russian Federation is justified, since there are known limitations in the Montreux Convention on tonnage and the amount of time for ships of non-Black Sea countries to stay in the area. On the other hand, countries such as Romania or Bulgaria cannot handle the Russian challenge on their own because of a lack of resources. At the same time, although Turkey has the appropriate resources, it prefers to follow its own course in Black Sea security, as practice shows.
Formally, NATO is increasing its presence in the Black Sea. So, in 2017, Alliance ships were in the sea for 80 days. In 2018, that figure has grown to 120 days. In 2019, it is estimated that the presence of NATO ships in the Black Sea was only 100 days. Another 125 days of presence in the Black Sea were provided by US Navy ships. However, unlike the United States, which provides missile destroyers, NATO presence is sustained with ships of different capabilities. Some of them have appropriate combat capabilities (missile destroyers and frigates). But others (mine sweepers, auxiliary ships) are not comparable with Russian capabilities in occupied Crimea. Thus, the quality of NATO presence is inferior to that of the US Navy.
Ukraine
The occupation and militarization of Crimea had the most negative impact on the naval security of Ukraine because of the unique position of the peninsula, which actually hangs over both the Black Sea and Azov ports of our country. At the same time, Kyiv cannot direct all its resources to enhance potential at sea, given the much greater threat from Russia on land. In these circumstances, Ukraine is implementing a series of military and non-military measures aimed at enhancing the deterrent effect and safeguarding national interests at sea. That’s because much is at stake for Ukraine in the context of Black Sea military security. During 2019, 160 million tons of cargo passed through 13 key seaports of Ukraine – 121 million tons of which was the export of Ukrainian products.
Within the framework of the implementation of the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, the military presence in the southern regions of Ukraine has been increased through the deployment of new units of Army and Navy. Thereby, the threat of successful Russian landing was reduced. Parallel within the framework of the missile program, work is being carried on the Neptune anti-ship cruise missile, which should, by mid-2020s, become the basis of anti-ship missile complexes of various types.
At the same time in parallel to national actions, additional measures are being taken to deter aggressive actions by the Russian Federation at sea in the framework of cooperation with the US and NATO. Cooperation with the USA allows to develop the ship and boat capabilities of the Navy through the transfer of boats of the Island class to Ukraine. First two came two Odessa in November 2019 – three more planned to be transferred in 2021. Also, possibility of Mark VI boat transfer first become known in March 2020. The increased presence of US destroyers in the Black Sea area is an additional factor in maintaining stability and security. In the same way, the US Congress is actively involved in the issues related to Ukraine’s naval potential. Since 2018 the Pentagon’s budgets approved by Congress include provisions for enhancing Ukraine’s defense capabilities at sea.
Due to the relative weakness of its economic potential, Ukraine will in the future be forced to rely on a set of military and political-diplomatic means to safeguard its own interests in the Black Sea.
Conclusions
The slowdown in the arrival of new ships to Russian Black Sea fleet did not affect the training tempo of Russian troops in the occupied Crimea. Moscow continues to harbor desire to make it as difficult as possible for the US/NATO to project force in the Black Sea basin in case of need. On the other hand, problems with the completion of the rearmament of the Black Sea Fleet together with aging of majority of ships call into question the possibility of an effective long-term blockade of Ukrainian ports of the Black Sea. Though Russian potential should not be underestimated and it’s wise for Ukraine and its international partners to prepare for worse-case scenario.
NATO countries in the region respond differently to the growing Russian threat. Romania and Bulgaria are implementing plans to modernize their armed forces and are ready to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP. Bucharest not only has more financial resources to modernize, but also demonstrates the political will to counter Russia in Black Sea. At the same time Sofia is more limited in financial capacity and prefers to balance between the Russian Federation and Western structures. Turkey’s attention in the context of naval security is focused mainly on the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. At the same time, Black Sea security is not a self-sufficient issue for Ankara. Taken together, these calculations deter Turkey from actively countering Russia in Black Sea.
The US is ready to play an important role in the Black Sea security issue and is working out different scenarios in the event of a possible major war with Russia. However, other regions are actively competing for Washington’s resources – Europe is forced to compete particularly closely with the neighboring Middle East. NATO is passive in Black Sea security. NATO prefers to focus more on scenarios of possible war in the Baltic States and Poland than on scenarios of the Black Sea war despite the fact that Crimea was militarized much more heavily compared with Kaliningrad exclave in last six years.
Mykola Bielieskov,
Kyiv-based analyst specializing on
Ukraine foreign, defense and security policy
18 апреля 2016 информационное агентство Reuters сообщило, что военный самолет КНР впервые приземлился на одном из контролируемых Китаем искусственных островов 
Ukrainian Strategic Watcher 